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PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGIC OPINIONS
IN COURT
Wiadimir Eliasberg
The author is a practicing psychiatrist in New York City. He was educated
(M.D. and Ph.D) in Germany and served in the German Army Medical Corps during
World War I. In 1926 he founded the German Congress for Psychotherapy and
became Editor of the Allgemeine artzl. Zeitsch. f. Psyehotherapie. In 1938 he came
to the United States, continued his medical studies, received recognition from the
State of New York as a Qualified Psychiatrist and Qualified Examiner. He has
more than 250 publications to his credit in English, French, German and Italian in
the fields of psychiatry, psychology and their applications in forensics, industry,
education and other fields.
He has taught Forensic Psychiatry for the Munich Bar Association and Applied
and Social Psychology in Rutgers University.
His "New Theory of the Perpetrator and the Duties of the Psychiatric Expert"
was published in this JOURNAL for Nov.-Dec., 1939, "Criminal Prophylaxis," Sept.-
Oct., 1944, and "Opposing Expert Testimony" in Nov.-Dec., 1945.-EDITOR.
Psychology has become a system of knowledge based on scien-
tific data and an indispensable base of psychiatry. I want to
mention a few of the landmarks in the contributions of psychol-
ogy to court procedure. In 1903 the first volume of William
Stern's Contributions to the Psychology of Testimony were pub-
lished.' In 1907 Clara and William Stern's Recalling, Deposing,
Lying opened a series of valuable books by psychologists. Fore-
most among them were the contributions by Karl Marbe. At
Harvard Hugo M\uensterberg 2 taught his students the pitfalls
of testimony. A survey of his own and other publications came
out in 1923. Psychopathology based on experimental psychology
was furthered by R. Sommer3 and A. Gregor.4 A highly valuable
contribution was that by Robert H. Gault.5  He surveyed not
only the older investigations of testimony but in a very clear
and concise chapter on Attitudes he made this modern concept
of psychology available to criminology. The present author,
1 L. William Stern, Beitrage zur Pasychocogie der Aussage, Johann Aibrosius
Barth, Leipzig, 1903.
Clara and William Stern, i.rinnerung, Aussage, Luege, Johann Ambrosius Barth,
Leipzig, 1907.
Karl Marbe, Crundzuege der Forensischen .Psaohologie, C. H. Beck, Muenchen,
1913.
Ibid, Fortschritte der .Psychologie und Ihrer Anwendangen, B. G. Teubner,
Leipzig, Berlin, 1912.
Ibid, Die Betriebsunfaelle auf der Deutschen Beichsbahn im, Jahre 1925, Die"
Reichsbahn, Amtliches Nachrichtenblatt, 1926, p. 246.
2 Hugo Muensterberg, On the Witness stand, Essays on Psychology and Crime,
New York, McClure Co., 1909.
3 R. Sommer, Lehrbuch der psyehopathologischen Untersuchungsmethoden, Berlin
und Wien 1899, p. 1 ff. Ibid Diagnortik der Geisteskrankheiten, 2. Aufl. Berlin
und Wien 1901, p. 14.
4 A. Gregor, Leitfaden der experimentellen Psychopathologie, Berlin, 1910.
5 Robert H. Gault, Criminology, D. C. Heath and Co., Boston, New York 1932.
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also trained in psychology, has built up the concept of motiva-
tions.6 While attitudes are defined as mental and neural states
of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive
or dynamic influence upon the original response to all objects
and situations7 in the motivation, the emphasis is on the relation-
ship to consciousness or potential consciousness and in this way
the psychological concept of motivation contains the bases for
the lawyers' handling of negligence.
Great progress has been achieved in the differential psychol-
ogy of testimony. The testimony of children, of boys and girls
of prepubertal age, of adolescents of primitive state of mind, of
morons, of dwellers in rural areas, the influence of special train-
ing, skill, social psychological ties, food, alcohol, drugs were ex-
perimentally investigated. At the same time psychology was
furthered through the findings of the neurologists especially in
cases of aphasia and agnosia. Here it was shown that appar-
ently simple mental processes, as the perceptions, consist of com-
ponents and that each of them may be put out of commission
separately.
Psychology, assimilating all these teachings to its own find-
ings, has finally become a full fledged science.8 Small wonder
then, that it demanded to be heard and to contribute its insight
to the solution of burning problems, not as a handmaiden that
carries the train but, to use the famous comparison of Kant,
walks ahead of her mistress and bears the torch for her.
A psychological expert for the first time was called in to the
trial after the great derailment near Muellheim, Baden in the
summer of 1911. Karl Marbe, Professor of psychology in
Wuerzburg, offered to clear what had happened by means of
reaction experiments. Soon afterward he appeared in trials to
6W. Eliasberg, Beohtspflege und Psychologie (Administration of Justice and
Psychology), Carl Heymanns, Berlin, 1932.
7 Gordon W. Allport, Attitudes, Handbook of Social Psychology, 1935, edited by
Carl Murchison, Worcester, Mass., 1935.
8 Jerome Michael, Mortimer Adler, Criminal Law and Social Science, pp. 55-65
to the contraryl These authors in the abstract and somewhat haughty style, which
is characteristic of their work, wind up by saying: There is no scientific psychology,
nor criminology. Unfortunately it seems that their criticism has come to stay
among non-psychiatrist, non-criminologist, non-soeiologists like Jerome Hall, "Crim-
inal Responsibility," Columbia Law Review, 1945, p. 681. All these critics and
authors of "crisis-books" overlook the fact that in the practice there is much less
dissension among competent men than would appear from the discussion of principles.
I have shown that the psychology of the irresistible impulse has many aspects and
consequently many criteria exist. In a strictly experiential, if not experimental way,
many so-called critical points could be cleared up for all practical purposes and it is
to be hoped that men of great experience will also furnish us in due time with a
satisfactory theory. Agnosticism has never achieved anything and it is no basis for
a criticism of our present psychology; or would any of the agnostics like to revert
to the stage before the introduction into the courtroom of modern experimental
psychology of the testimony of the adult and the child!
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evaluate the testimony of children and in 1913 he published his
experience9 in the book Grundzuege der Forensischen Psy-
chologie. However, most courts and psychiatrists did not take
cognizance of the existence of psychology and its teachings.
Thus, the very typical book by George W. Jacoby 0 does not list
psychology in its index other than as part of the physiology of
the brain and psychological experts are not mentioned. In my
book which came out in 1932 (quoted above) I described the con-
tributions of social psychology. My main topics were social psy-
chology of the experts, the sociological relations between the ex-
pert and lay witnesses and the role of all those cooperating in
the trial."
After this very short historical survey we may now approach
the following questions:
1. What is the difference between the psychologists' and the
psychiatrists' opinion?
2. Can there be a unification, harmony and integration be-
tween the psychologists and the psychiatrists as experts and
can their opinions be made to work together?
Differences between Psychologic and Psychiatric Opinion
The differences consist in:
1. The specific training of the expert and his field of ex-
perience.
2. The subject matter which is discussed in the opinion.
3. The logical structure of the opinion itself.
There is no use denying that the psychology of childhood and
youth, sex psychology, experimental and social psychology of
testimony and the witness on the whole have played a very small
role if any in the medical training of psychiatrists but have
been taken up largely by psychologists (Ph.D.s). Many methods
on the other hand that are taught in the laboratory have no
immediate bearing upon life and the court. One may say, then,
that the training of both psychologists and psychiatrists can and
must be reorganized if they want to appear in court. The full
competency of psychologists like the late William Stern, Hugo
Muensterberg or Karl Marbe should not be denied and in this
respect it is important that these psychologists themselves have
9 K. Marbe, Psychologisohe Gatachten zum Prozess wegen des Muellheimer Eisen-
bahnunghteoks, Fortschr. d. Psychol. Bd. 1, 1913, S. 339 if. ibid., Der Psyehologie als
Gerichtsgutaahter im Straf-und Zivilprozess, Stuttgart, 1926.
10 George W. Jacoby, The Unsound Mind and the Law, Funk & Wagnalls, New
York, London, 1918.
11 W. Eliasberg, "Opposing Expert Testimony," J. of Criminal Law and Crimin-
ology, Vol. 36, No. 4, Nov.-Dec. 1945.
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excluded questions of psychopathology, e.g. selfincrimination
from their opinions; th-ns Marbe12 states explicitly that he would
not render opinions on self-incrimination.
While it is easy to differentiate, on the conceptual level, the
subject matter of opinions stating that pathology belongs to the
M.D. and the measurement of reactions of normal persons to the
Ph.D. in psychology, it should be noted that normality and ab-
normality have a certain breadth of variation. It has often been
stated that the phase of puberty in the normal development is
closer to pathology than to normality. Such differentiation' can
be very difficult in practice. There are cases of positive or nega-
tive malingering. It is known that patients with complete blind-
ness and particularly with aphasia or with paranoia may quite
aptly dissimulate.' 3 The whole question of iiormality or pathol-
ogy is complicated because in each individual case it must first
be stated that there is no known pathology. Normalityor pathol-
ogy are not diagnoses that offer themselves to the layman in
either field, let alone to the layman in both fields. Even in the
average case it is quite a task to find out whether the probable
cause of a crime is to be sought in the natural course of events
as in the development of a character, or in a momentary blurring
of the consciousness, or in a permanent motivation, or finally in
a pathological process which might be very slight in the begin-
ning. Here again the problem is whether the beginning of the
process must be adjudged as of the same importance as the fully
developed disease. Who is to say this but the highly experienced
M.D.-psychiatrist. 4 . Wherever the expert's opinion branches
out into .treatment there again the psychologists will have to
give precedence to the psychiatrists, although it should be recog-
nized that on the technical level the treatment of aphasia is
largely based on psychology. Here we can see that the issue of
precedence is by far not so important as that of wholehearted
cooperation.'-
On the logical level the diagnosis of the physician is directed
toward a generality, namely the establishment of the type of
12 Karl Marbe, Psychologische Gutachten anlaesslich des Wiederaufnahmegesuchs
in Rierprozess Juerges, (Elberfeld) Archiv fuer die gesamte Psychologie, Vol. 82,
No. 1-2, 1931.
13 Anton, Ueber die Selbstwahirnehnmng der Herderkrankmgen bei Rindenblind-
heit und Taubheit. Arch. f. Psychiatrie *s Nervenkranch. Vol. 32, p. 86, 1899.
Redlich and Bonvicini: Ueber das Fehlen der Wahrnehmung der eigenen Blindheit
bei Hirnceankheiten, 1908. (anosognosia)
14W. Eliasberg, The New Theory of the Perpetrator and the Duties of the
Psychiatric Expert,'" .. of Crim. Law and Criminology, Vol. XXX, No. 4, Nov.-Dec.
1939.
15W. Eliasberg, "Training and Healing after Apoplexy," Clinical Medicine,
Vol. 51, No. 8, August 1944, pp. 203-204.
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pathological process that has befallen the party. For the prac-
tical purposes of the court it is often not necessary to show how
the personality has changed under the influence of a psychotic
process.
If one can prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the perpe-
trator at the time of the commitment of the crime had been
suffering from paresis or schizophrenia, then there should be no
problem for the jury. It is not necessary to describe the paretic
or schizophrenic personality and to show how the deed has
sprung up within the pathological personality. It is sufficient
that there is some pathological inadequacy of motivations or
lack of such motivations: pathological is just what is inadequate
in the premorbid personality. There can be no partial responsi-
bility where there is true psychosis. The psychological opinion
on the other hand is directed either toward an individual in his
singularity or to the general type of reactions, sensations, per-
ceptions to which the individual's reactions belong. In the first
case the psychologist makes an individual character or person-
ality diagnosis, in the second the diagnosis of a general type of
reactions. But for both purposes what the psychologist does
differs also logically from what the psychiatrist is expected to do.
Integration
Integration does not consist of the exchange of personal
amenities nor can there be a unity of subject matter or a unity
of the viewpoints. Were there only mutual malice of psychia-
trists and psychologists, then we certainly would already have
that objective harmony and there would be no room for the multi-
plicity of sciences and viewpoints. That doesn't mean there is
no such malice; there is very much and up to this day we see re-
lapses to that blustering style of the professors at small univer-
sities of the 19th century who used to empty the vials of sarcasm
on the unfortunate human being that did not share to the dot
their more or less scurrilous ideas. There is still much sociology
of the in-and outgroup, but on the whole these are trivialities
which are not worth discussing.
Integration cannot be a giving up of different viewpoints. We
cannot in such manner discover heretofore hidden unity of the
subject matter. Integration and unity are not ready made, they
cannot be had for the asking and cannot simply be excavated.
Unity is an infinite task the solution of which may be approached
asymptotically; nor is a method of getting that unity found in
simply stringing up the different viewpoints like beads. History
of the sciences shows, however, that differences that seemed
[V7ol. 39
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unsurmountable in bygone centuries appear small and insignifi-
cant in our present time. Why? Because the viewpoints them-
selves may form alloys as for instance physical chemistry, or in
our field, psychological psychiatry. On the other hand view-
points and problems may drift apart as theology or philosophy
and the sciences of experience have done.' In other words
unity is a task, not an idea. Each time has the right to demand
certain unities and to give up others. And there is finally the
question: who should demand unity and who should be forbidden
to give up his independence? Thus in a trial it is in the mind of
the court and the jury that the unity of the viewpoints should
be worked out. It is often absolutely unnecessary that one psy-
chiatrist should politely confirm the idea of the other, or the
psychologist's opinion simply be repeated by the psychiatrist.
The unity in the mind of the court will be more valuable the more
different the viewpoints are that are offered. To sum up, we
have to consider the problem of the differences between the
opinions in the courtroom, independently from the problem of
unity. While we may talk about differences in training ad per-
sonata, and such differences will become greater or smaller, the
question of unity is one that concerns the mind of the finder of
fact. His labors will be the more fruitful, the more honest and
truthful the objective viewpoints that are offered to him. Other-
wise, what matters most is that honest and bona fide experts
should be available to the courts. It is one of the foremost tasks
of the organizations, i.e. the American Psychiatric Association
and the American Psychological Association, to work out the
viewpoints. There should be lists of men whom these associa-
tions consder competent experts.
The question of the fees should be worked out and last but not
least the public relation offices should make it clear to the court
and to the public at large that opposing experts' testimonies are
much better than a presumptuous attitude on the part of the find-
ers of fact who are not in a position to judge difficult facts.
16
16W. Eliasberg, "Opposing Expert Testimony," J. of Criminal Law and Crimin-
ology, Vol. 36, No. 4, Nov.-Dec. 1945.
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